The killing of 27 police officers near Mangi Dam in Pakistan’s Balochistan province has exposed serious weaknesses in the country’s internal-security structure.
Nine officers were killed when militants attacked a police post guarding a pumping station in Ziarat district. The attackers abducted 18 other officers, who were later found shot dead in nearby mountains. The scale of the attack, and the militants’ ability to leave the area with so many captives, raised questions about preparedness, intelligence, communications and the availability of reinforcements.
Relatives of the slain officers held a prolonged sit-in beside their coffins, demanding justice and stronger action against those responsible. The Balochistan government suspended the Ziarat superintendent of police and established an inquiry committee to examine deployment, command, response and coordination among all law-enforcement and security agencies. The committee was also instructed to determine whether negligence, operational failure or a breakdown in coordination contributed to the losses.
These developments do not by themselves prove that Pakistan’s police and military institutions are in open conflict. They do, however, point to a growing gap between the institutions that carry frontline risk and those that control the country’s larger counterterrorism resources and strategy.
Police on an expanding frontline
That imbalance is increasingly visible in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where police stations, patrols and checkpoints have become frequent targets.
According to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, Pakistan recorded 128 militant attacks in May 2026, a 27 percent increase from April. The violence killed 71 civilians, 68 security personnel and six members of local peace committees. Balochistan was the worst-affected province, recording 71 attacks during the month.
Provincial police are expected to protect communities, gather local intelligence, secure roads and government installations, respond to militant attacks and maintain public order. Yet they often operate with fewer resources and less institutional influence than the army and Frontier Corps.
The Frontier Corps is formally under Pakistan’s Interior Ministry but is commanded by officers seconded from the army. It carries out border-security, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism duties alongside the military and provincial law-enforcement agencies. This overlapping structure makes effective coordination essential, particularly when isolated police units come under sustained attack.
The Mangi Dam inquiry is therefore significant. Its mandate extends beyond the conduct of one police commander and includes the response and coordination of all relevant agencies. Responsibility should not be placed on provincial officers before the inquiry establishes what intelligence was available, what assistance was requested and how quickly supporting forces responded.
Staffing and morale
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police is also facing substantial personnel shortages. Reporting in June found that the force lacked about 170 supervisory officers in grades 17 to 19, including more than 100 assistant and deputy superintendents and 68 officers at the superintendent and senior superintendent levels. The provincial police chief separately said the force was around 11,000 personnel below its sanctioned strength.
The federal Establishment Division transferred 10 police officers from Punjab to designated “hard areas” in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan in May. Police authorities have also sought special financial allowances to improve morale and retain personnel as attacks on the force increase.
These measures acknowledge the danger but do not resolve the deeper problem. Police cannot be expected to hold exposed positions, gather intelligence and absorb repeated attacks without adequate staffing, fortified facilities, modern equipment and dependable operational support.
Lessons from Balochistan
The July attacks in Balochistan killed 42 people, according to Pakistan’s military: four civilians near Hanna Urak, 27 police officers in the Mangi Dam attack and its aftermath, and 11 soldiers in an attack on a convoy near Bela-Winder. The state responded with a large joint operation involving the army, Frontier Corps and police.
That response demonstrates that the country’s security institutions can act together after a major attack. The more difficult question is whether the same level of coordination exists before and during an assault, when isolated police units need timely intelligence, ammunition, evacuation and reinforcement.
Pakistan’s internal-security crisis is no longer limited to a confrontation between the state and armed groups. It is also testing the distribution of responsibility inside the state itself.
The army and paramilitary forces possess heavier resources and broader strategic authority. Provincial police maintain daily contact with vulnerable communities and are often the first to confront attacks. When responsibility, resources and accountability are distributed unevenly, institutional trust weakens.
Militant groups benefit from those gaps. Police officers become easier targets, local intelligence networks deteriorate and communities lose confidence in the state’s capacity to protect them.
Pakistan does not simply need more operations after attacks. It needs a security structure in which provincial police receive the personnel, protection, authority and institutional support required for the role they are already being asked to perform.
Disclaimer: This article was submitted by an independent contributor. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the editorial position of Khaama Press.
