The 2026 Legislative Assembly elections in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir have once again exposed the widening gap between Islamabad’s promise of democratic self-government and the tightly controlled political system operating in the territory.
Presented as an exercise in popular representation, the elections are taking place amid boycott campaigns, allegations of ballot manipulation, communications restrictions, heavy security deployment, and deadly clashes between protesters and state forces.
A contested election with little public confidence
The election for the 45 general seats of the Legislative Assembly was divided into three phases, officially because of security concerns and the availability of military personnel for election duties. Voting was held in Mirpur Division on 27 July, followed by Muzaffarabad Division and the 12 refugee constituencies on 2 August. Poonch Division is scheduled to vote on 10 August.
In the first phase, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz secured nine of the 13 seats, while the Pakistan Peoples Party won four, according to preliminary results issued by the regional Election Commission.
However, the result emerged from an electoral environment in which one of the territory’s largest political parties, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, had withdrawn from the process altogether. PTI boycotted the election, citing concerns over electoral fraud and the wider political crisis in the territory.
The Joint Awami Action Committee, which had led months of protests over electricity tariffs, flour prices, political rights, and the controversial refugee seats, also urged its supporters to boycott the vote.
The organisation was proscribed under anti-terrorism legislation on 5 June. Several of its activists and leaders were subsequently detained, went into hiding, or continued organising from protest camps.
Some local accounts described polling stations with minimal or virtually nonexistent voter participation, even as substantial crowds assembled for protest marches and sit-ins. The extent of the reported low participation could not be independently established across all constituencies, and government officials presented a sharply different account of public turnout.
Videos and claims circulated on social media alleging late opening of polling stations, ballot stuffing, multiple voting, the use of forged identity documents, and the removal of polling agents. Political parties also accused one another of rigging, ballot-box interference, and other electoral malpractices. Many of the more specific allegations, however, remain unverified.
At the same time, some polling stations were alleged to have recorded unusually high and heavily one-sided turnout figures. Local political accounts attributed concerns over reported turnout of between 80 and 90 percent to senior PPP figures, including Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf. However, a primary statement or official station-level record confirming this specific allegation could not be located.
Concerns over the election’s credibility are not confined to one opposition party or political faction. PTI, PPP, nationalist organisations, local campaigners, and civil-society groups have all, at different times, accused parties supported by Islamabad of manipulating the electoral machinery.
Low participation and diluted local representation
The most serious challenge to the election’s legitimacy is the apparent disconnect between the official electoral process and the political participation of people living within the territory.
There are approximately 3.8 million registered voters for the 2026 election. According to electoral rolls released by the regional Election Commission, approximately 3.37 million voters are registered in the 33 territorial constituencies, while nearly 439,000 are attached to the 12 constituencies reserved for refugees living elsewhere in Pakistan.
These 12 seats have become one of the most contentious features of the system. They constitute more than one-fourth of the 45 general seats in the assembly, despite being elected outside the territory.
Local critics argue that the arrangement allows political parties, government institutions, and administrative networks based in Pakistan to exercise disproportionate influence over the formation of the government. Reuters reported that JAAC has accused Islamabad of using the refugee seats to manipulate local politics, an allegation rejected by Pakistani officials.
The Joint Awami Action Committee has demanded the abolition of these seats, arguing that residents of the territory should determine their own government.
The regional Supreme Court, however, ruled in June that the seats are constitutionally protected and cannot be abolished without a constitutional amendment. Supporters of the arrangement argue that the seats preserve representation for Kashmiris displaced from areas administered by India.
Nevertheless, the arrangement creates a clear democratic contradiction. Residents are told that the Legislative Assembly represents them, yet a substantial bloc within that assembly is elected by people living outside the territory.
At the same time, the territory itself has no representation in Pakistan’s National Assembly or Senate.
The result is a system in which residents are neither fully represented within Pakistan’s federal institutions nor granted complete authority over their own local assembly.
Leadership shaped by Islamabad’s political balance
The identity of the party governing Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir has historically followed the political balance in Islamabad. Since the introduction of the parliamentary system in the 1970s, successive elections have repeatedly produced governments aligned with the party holding power at the federal level.
This pattern has persisted across ideologically different political parties. When the Pakistan Peoples Party controlled Islamabad, the PPP strengthened its position in the territory. The PML-N rose when it governed federally. In 2021, PTI won a majority in the assembly while it was in power at the centre. In 2026, the PML-N entered the election as the dominant federal governing party and secured nine of the first 13 seats declared.
This repeated alignment does not, by itself, prove manipulation in every constituency. However, over several decades, it has reinforced the local perception that governments are not produced exclusively by the political preferences of residents, but are also shaped by the resources, institutions, and patronage networks of the party controlling Islamabad.
A detailed Human Rights Watch investigation published in 2006 documented longstanding concerns over Islamabad’s interference in the territory’s political administration, restrictions on political participation, and the dependence of elected institutions on Pakistan’s federal government.
A historical record of contested elections
Allegations of manipulation are not unique to 2026. They have followed elections in the territory since the parliamentary system emerged in the 1970s.
Historical accounts cited by local political writers describe early elections as being accompanied by boycotts, administrative pressure, and accusations of large-scale rigging. Some accounts state that the Muslim Conference boycotted the 1975 process. However, easily accessible independent documentation confirming the precise circumstances of that boycott remains limited.
The 2006 election was widely criticised by opposition politicians, former prime ministers of the territory, and local observers, who accused the establishment of supporting the Muslim Conference through a combination of pressure and patronage.
Human Rights Watch documented widespread allegations that the election was manipulated in favour of Islamabad-backed candidates. The organisation also reported that approximately 60 pro-independence candidates had been prevented from contesting because they would not support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.
In 2016, PTI, then in opposition, published a white paper alleging manipulation of voter lists through the National Database and Registration Authority, cash distribution, politically timed development schemes, and the appointment or transfer of officials considered sympathetic to the ruling party.
Those were PTI’s allegations and were not presented as findings of an independent investigation. Their significance lies partly in the fact that similar accusations have been made by different political parties, depending on which party controlled the federal government in Islamabad.
In 2021, PTI won the election while governing Pakistan federally. The contest was marked by violence, mutual accusations of rigging, claims of money distribution, and allegations that polling stations had been captured or improperly influenced.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that three political workers had been killed and called for investigations into alleged money distribution, the arrest of polling agents, the capture of a polling station, and the stamping of ballot papers.
Violence amid political rejection
The 2026 election has been overshadowed by the confrontation between the authorities and the Joint Awami Action Committee. JAAC had mobilised residents around economic and political grievances, including expensive electricity, flour subsidies, the refugee seats, and the limited authority of local institutions.
During and after the first phase of voting, severe clashes were reported, particularly around Rawalakot.
JAAC claimed that more than 30 people were killed in clashes with security forces around the city. Reuters reported the allegation but said it could not independently verify the figure because internet access, roads, banking services, and communications had been disrupted.
Some JAAC representatives and local witnesses further alleged that security forces used live ammunition against demonstrators, including protesters they described as unarmed or carrying white flags. These specific details have not been independently confirmed.
Authorities have disputed the protesters’ version of events. Regional officials alleged that armed and masked individuals had infiltrated the demonstrations and fired on security personnel. JAAC and local campaigners have rejected the authorities’ characterisation of the movement.
Internet and mobile communications were restricted, roads were blocked, and access to affected areas was limited. Amnesty International documented an internet shutdown, mass arrests, and reports of deadly force during the crackdown.
The imposition of communications restrictions during a disputed election further damaged the credibility of the process by preventing independent scrutiny precisely when public accountability was most necessary.
An election cannot acquire legitimacy merely because ballots are printed and polling stations are opened. When large sections of the population boycott the process, protesters are confronted with force, political organisations are banned, and communications are shut down, the election risks becoming an instrument of state control rather than an expression of public consent.
A democratic façade under tightening control
The 2026 election does not represent a sudden breakdown of an otherwise healthy democratic system. It is the latest expression of a system shaped by controlled participation, ideological exclusion, and political dependence on Islamabad.
The low or disputed turnout in some territorial constituencies, the boycott by PTI and JAAC, the presence of 12 externally elected refugee seats, and the historical alignment of local governments with Pakistan’s federal ruling party all weaken the claim that the assembly reflects the unrestricted will of the resident population.
No major publicly identified international election-observation mission had issued a comprehensive independent assessment of the process at the time of writing. The absence of such an assessment limits the possibility of establishing broad public confidence in either the voting process or the officially declared turnout.
Amnesty International has not issued a detailed election-observation assessment, but it has raised serious concerns over the proscription of JAAC, internet restrictions, mass arrests, and reports of deadly force.
Pakistan continues to describe the territory as autonomous and democratically governed. Yet democracy cannot be reduced to periodic elections among parties operating within constitutional boundaries imposed by Islamabad.
Nor can local representation be considered meaningful when the elected leadership remains dependent on Islamabad, more than a quarter of the general seats are filled by voters outside the territory, and political movements advocating alternative constitutional futures face legal exclusion.
The 2026 elections therefore appear less like an exercise in self-determination than an attempt to renew the appearance of legitimacy around a political order whose essential terms the local population is not permitted to change.
The institutions may be local, but the limits of power, the acceptable political choices, and the ultimate authority remain firmly in Islamabad.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial position of Khaama Press.
